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Introduction
Financial liberalization has led to an increased integration of financial markets over the last 30 years. The emerging and developing countries, however, entered this process with under-capitalized and weak banks.
In result, large shares of the financial sector in these countries are controlled by subsidiaries of foreign banks. Thus, the financial integration was accompanied by a development of asymmetric cross-border owner-subsidiary relationships. It has been a long-standing concern for policy makers that increased foreign penetration may weaken the bank lending channel of monetary policy and put the economy at risk of financial crisis contagion. In this paper we investigate the working of the bank lending channel and the role of foreign-owned banks.
We explore the consequences of this asymmetric integration in the particular area of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Banks dominate the financial structure of the CEE economies and the most of these banks are majority foreign-owned following a period of rapid increase in foreign penetration of the banking sector in the late 90s. As of 2009 the share of foreign banks in the total assets of the banking sectors in the CEE economies was greater than 80 percent. In other European Union member states this number stood at 25 percent 1 .
We collect data on credit growth and ownership for 440 banks in the eleven CEE countries 2 in the years 1998-2012. We regress the real rate of growth of net credit on the foreign ownership dummy, the change in the monetary policy rate and their interaction (plus bank-level and macroeconomic controls). We make three contributions to the empirical literature on the bank lending channel. First, we document the existence of the bank lending channel in the CEE economies in both tranquil and crisis times. Second, we show that lending in foreign banks is less responsive to both tightening and loosening of host country's monetary policy in both tranquil times and during financial crisis. That is, the bank lending channel is more tamed via foreign banks. The two results come out as robust finding after a battery of additional checks that include, among others, removal of years of change of bank ownership and controlling for potentially different behavior of state-owned banks.
Third, we investigate the reasons for the observed difference between foreign and domestic banks. We go "inside" the bank lending channel as in Gambacorta (2005) and interact monetary policy with bank controls.
We show that the bank lending channel operates mostly through size (in full sample) and profitability (in foreign banks). We find that differences between foreign and domestic bank reaction to monetary policy can be attributed to within-group and between-group heterogeneity, leaving no role for the type of ownership on top of balance sheet differences. We also go "outside" the bank lending channel and check how foreign banks react to economic conditions in their home country and financial conditions of their parent bank. We 1 Own calculations based on Claessens and Van Horen (2013) . In 2009 in the eleven CEE economies this number varies between 64 and 99 percent. In the non-CEE EU economies foreign bank penetration is more heterogeneous and varies from 2 percent (Spain and Netherlands) to 95 percent (Luxembourg), with Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg having more than 50 percent of their banking system foreign-owned.
2 Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
find no systematic responses to either parent country or parent bank controls.
Thus, we can contrast our findings with the internal capital market hypothesis as in (Campello, 2002 , de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010 , Wu et al., 2011 . This hypothesis proposes, that a foreign bank can easily obtain surplus liquidity from either the parent bank or other subsidiaries within the financial conglomerate.
It can also be forced to transfer liquidity away when other banks within the conglomerate are in trouble.
Foreign banks operations are thus less dependent on macro conditions in the host country and more dependent on macro conditions in the home country, compared to domestic banks. On aggregate, the higher is foreign penetration of the banking sector, the less effective is the bank lending channel of monetary policy. We can test the internal market hypothesis only indirectly, as our sample does not include subsidiaries in developed economies. We find that the parent bank characteristics are largely irrelevant for explaining bank lending channel differential between domestically and foreign-owned banks. Given the importance of the parent bank in financial conglomerates we conclude that our data do not offer strong support for the internal market hypothesis.
In contranst, we propose an alternative explanation, the market segmentation hypothesis. Foreign banks may inherit credit relationships with clients of their parents' (e.g. lending to subsidiaries of firms that entered CEE via foreign direct investments or take-overs). If there is selection into foreign expansion, then foreign-owned banks will lend to more productive clients. When foreign-owned banks have better know-how (e.g. screening technology or marketing) then they can grant credit to more reliable clients, who can service their liabilities even under high interest rates. Under this hypothesis the bank lending channel effectiveness is independent of the level of foreign penetration of the banking sector. We show that data partially supports the market segmentation hypothesis.
The relationship between bank ownership and the growth of credit has been receiving an increased interest in the literature since Peek and Rosengren (1997) , who show that Japanese-owned banks in the US contracted their lending in a response to the slump in the Japanese stock market. The CEE transition countries are a natural field for empirical studies of foreign-owned banks behavior. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) is the first study that looks at the relationship between foreign ownership in the CEE countries and the growth of credit. They find a positive relationship between foreign banks and the private sector credit growth; that during crisis periods domestic banks contract their credit base, but greenfield foreign banks do not;
and that conditions in the home country matter for foreign banks' growth of credit. Aydin (2008) further confirms that credit growth is higher in foreign banks. Contrary to the former, she shows that conditions in the home country do not matter for the foreign banks' growth of credit. Allen et al. (2015) show that during domestic financial crises foreign banks provide credit, while government banks contract and that the reverse has happened during the global financial crisis 3 . Bonin et al. (2005) find that in the CEE countries foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient and provide better services, while Naaborg and Lensink (2008) in the similar sample find a somewhat contrary result, that foreign-owned banks are less profitable. None 3 Another contributions that look at the role of foreign banks during the global financial crisis in a wider geographical setting are Adams- Kane et al. (2013) and Ongena et al. (2013) .
of the cited studies however, takes into account the monetary policy in a host country. A situation when bank lending changes after a change in nominal interest rates in known in the literature as the bank lending channel of the monetary policy. In this paper we ask, whether the bank lending channel operates differently via domestic and foreign banks.
The bank lending channel pioneered by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) on aggregate data and Kashyap and Stein (2000) on bank-level data assumes that, at the bank-level, deposits and other sources of financing are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, when a central bank raises interest rates, the supply of credit at the bank level goes down. Wu et al. (2011) study the bank lending channel jointly in the CEE, Latin America and South-East Asia economies. They find that after a monetary policy contraction the growth of credit in foreign banks goes down less compared to in domestic banks (and the reverse is true after a monetary policy expansion). They claim that this is due to a foreign banks access to funding from parent banks through an internal capital market. However, the bank lending channel operates only in times of crises and not in tranquil times.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays our data sources, data construction and the empirical procedure. We present our three central results and robustness checks in Section 3. We discuss the internal market and market segmentation hypotheses in Section 4. Last section concludes.
Data and Estimation Procedure
We construct our dataset using bank-level balance sheet and macroeconomic data. We acquired bank-level data from Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by Bureau van Dijk. Bankscope comprises a large number of standardized, comparable indicators at annual frequency. We measure bank credit by net loans and create our dependent variable D.NetLoans, the growth of net loans at the bank level (measured in real terms). Then, we account for distributional differences constructing four independent variables. First, we measure size (Size) as a share of bank's total assets in all banks' assets in a given country in a given year. Next, we define profitability (Prof ) as a ratio of operating profit over total assets. We then have capitalization (Cap) as a ratio of total equity over total assets. We take a ratio of liquid assets over total assets to be a measure of liquidity ( Liq).
Identification of bank ownership was done in several steps, as this information is not easily available.
In particular, Bankscope only provides information about the owner in the most recent year. Apart from Bankscope, we used the database provided by Claessens and Van Horen (2013) . For banks not covered there we had to resort to individual banks' websites and financial reports and track changes in ownership back in time.
We have two variables that control for bank ownership: foreign and state ownership dummies: FGN and GOV. FGN takes value of 1 if at least 50% of bank capital is owned by foreign entities. This variable captures potentially different management practices and know-how in foreign banks and their ease in access- We use the same sources for the other macro controls: real GDP growth and inflation.
We take the first, unconditional look at the data in Tables 1 and 2 . In Table 1 we document betweengroup differences splitting the sample into foreign-owned and domestic banks. We find that foreign banks are on average larger, less liquid and less capitalized than domestic banks. We also find no significant difference in the rates of growth of credit between domestic and foreign banks.
In Table 2 we report unconditional correlations between descriptive bank-level variables. We find that the growth of credit is positively correlated with the bank profitability and that size is negatively correlated with capitalization, as in Allen et al. (2015) . Contrary to their data, however, we see that liquidity is Notes: p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
positively correlated with capitalization and profitability and that capitalization is positively correlated with profitability. The correlations between subsiadiary and parent bank are of the same sign as in Allen et al. (2015) : more capitalized parent bank have more profitable and less liquid subsidiaries. As our geographical and time coverage of data is similar to theirs, we report similar, albeit not identical summary statistics.
We document the cross-sectional facts about foreign and domestic banks and their evolution in time in further detail in Appendix 6.1. We also find that the capitalization and liquidity were decreasing in time in both groups. The average size of a domestic bank declined sharply after 2002 which roughly corresponds to the end of the biggest wave of penetration of local markets by foreign banks.
Estimation Specification
We estimate the model of the real rate of growth of loans of bank i in country j at time t, denoted by D.N etLoans ijt . To test if there are differences between foreign and domestic banks reactions to monetary policy we employ several variants of the following model specification:
In this, we label F GN both subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in host country j and independent banks that have majority ownership located abroad. If foreign banks have different credit policies then this estimate should be significant, as in Aydin (2008) and Allen et al. (2015) . Our main variables of interest are:
the change in the monetary policy instrument in country j in time t denoted by M P jt and its interaction with the foreign dummy M P jt * F GN it . If the bank lending channel is at work then the first estimate will be significant and negative. If the bank lending channel operates differently in foreign and domestic banks then the second estimate will be significant. If foreign banks react more to changes in monetary policy then we should see a negative estimate of the interaction term. If on the other hand, they react less, we should see a positive estimate of the interaction term. Apart from the foreign dummy we employ four bank controls Bank it of bank i in time t including size Size it (0), liquidity Liq it (+/-), capitalization Cap it (-) and profitability P rof it (+) with expected estimate signs in parentheses. We also introduce lagged dependent variable, the real rate of net loans, L.D.NetLoans (+) as explanatory variable 5 .
We also use macroeconomic conditions Economy jt differing across countries j and time t. We utilize the growth rate of the real GDP per capita (GDP jt ) and the inflation rate π jt to control for possible demand effects and economic instability of high inflation. We expect credit growth to respond positively to GDP growth and negatively to inflation. The details of construction of the all variables are provided in the Appendix 6.1.
It is well recognized (Adams- Kane et al., 2013 , Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2010 , Claessens and Van Horen, 2013 , Gambacorta, 2005 , Wu et al., 2011 that the presence of bank-specific controls induces an endogeneity problem in the estimation of equation 1. Thus, our method of choice is the "system-GMM" approach based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator and further augmented in the works of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . In this estimation we allow the dependent variable (D.N etLoans ijt )
to be potentially autocorrelated and contemporary bank controls (Size it , Liq it , Cap it and P rof it ) to be endogenous. We allow for up to 4 lags to serve as instruments. However, as system-GMM approach may easily fall into a problem of too many instruments, for each regression we report the number of instruments and the results of the Hansen test. To confirm the stability of our estimates we additionally report results from the pooled OLS and panel regression with time and country fixed effects. Country fixed effects control for country-specific legal and cultural differences. Time fixed effects remove the effects of aggregate shocks that affect all countries symmetrically.
Results

Benchmark
We begin with our benchmark estimation comparing the results from three models: a pooled OLS, a panel with country and time fixed effect and a system-GMM approach. The results are presented in Table 3 . First, the results confirm the existence of the bank lending channel. Banks contract their credit after an increase in the monetary policy rate (and expand after a decrease in the MP rate). The estimates of M P variable are negative and highly significant in all three estimations. This is the first main result of our paper. We further confirm this results in various robustness checks in the next subsection.
The estimates of the F GN are only highly significant in the OLS model, but lose any significance in the system-GMM model. We conclude, that foreign banks do not have different lending policies compared to domestic private banks per se as in Allen et al. (2015) . What we find however is that the bank lending channel works differently via foreign compared to via domestic banks.
In the second main result of this paper, we find that foreign banks react differently than domestic banks to changes in the monetary policy rate. The reaction of their credit is more tamed. After an increase in the monetary policy rate foreign banks contract their credit less than domestic banks (and expand their credit less than domestic banks after a decrease in the rate). We find the difference to be highly significant in all three specifications. The result is robust to various alternative specifications, which we show in the next subsection. Then, in the following subsections we explore what stands behind and what are possible consequences of this result.
In Table 3 we report the estimates for the full set of controls. All estimates are in line with an economic intuition. Other than for foreign, we also control for the public ownership of banks with a GOV dummy.
By interacting GOV dummy with the monetary policy M P variable we are able to assess whether the bank lending channel also works differently via government banks compared to private domestic banks. As in Allen et al. (2015) in the similar sample (but contrary to Micco and Panizza (2006) in the global sample)
we do not find GOV variable to be significant. We conclude that public banks do not have different lending policies than domestic private banks per se. We also find that the bank lending channel does not differ via government banks compared to private domestic banks. The results are robust across all specifications, therefore in the following subsections we do not report the estimates.
Loans are slow moving and autocorrelated with one lag. We formally test for autocorrelation of the dependent variable. We reject the null that AR(1) coefficient is equal to zero, but fail to reject the null that the AR(2) coefficient is equal to zero. This validates our specification with one lag dependent variable and the use of a system-GMM estimation.
We find that credit grows faster in smaller banks. More liquid banks and better capitalized banks extend less credit (as in Allen et al. (2015) ). As expected, profitability increases the growth of credit at the banklevel in all three estimations. Finally, we find that the growth of bank loans increases with the GDP growth and decreases with inflation. Estimates of the bank and macro controls are robust across all specifications, therefore in the following subsections we do not report the estimates.
Robustness and Further Evidence
Ownership Endogeneity. Our benchmark results reported in Table 3 may suffer from possible endogeneity of the take-over decision by foreign investors. First, the timing of a take-over may be determined by the previous performance which can be correlated with the past credit growth. Second, bank-specific Notes: The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The sample is 440 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998-2012. L.D.N etLoans is the lagged dependent variable, F GN and GOV are dummy variables for foreign and government ownership and M P is a change in the average nominal interest rate (monetary policy). Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in the Appendix. (1) is the pooled OLS regression, (2) is an OLS regression with time and country fixed effects, (3) is a system-GMM regression. Estimates are reported for the full set of regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
characteristics may change abruptly in the wake of a take-over.
To confirm the robustness of our benchmark results we run two alternative specifications of our benchmark model. First, we exclude the take-over observations, that is, the bank-year observations where F GN changes from 0 to 1. We label this exercise as "no switch years" and present the results in columns (1)-(3) of Table   4 . Second, we remove all banks that ever experienced a change in F GN from 0 to 1. We label this exercise as "no switch banks" and present the results in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 . The two main findings of this paper are robust: the existence of the bank lending channel (negative and significant M P estimate) and the differences in the bank lending channel between foreign and domestic private banks (positive and significant estimate of the interaction term F GN * M P ). Notes: The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The sample is 440 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998-2012. F GN is a foreign ownership dummy and M P is a change in the average nominal interest rate (monetary policy). Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in the Appendix. Models (1)- (3) are "no switch years": all observations when F GN changes from 0 to 1 are excluded. Models (4)-(6) are "no switch banks": all observations for all banks that have experienced a change in F GN from 0 to 1 are excluded. Estimates for macro and bank controls are suppressed. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Monetary Policy Independence. Our sample consists of countries with similar, albeit not identical monetary policy arrangements. While in the analyzed period the majority of the countries followed an independent monetary policy interest rate setting rule, some countries had their exchange rate pegged to the euro and some did not enjoy an independent monetary policy at all, due to their presence in the common currency area. Our hypothesis is that banks, when deciding on their credit growth, take into account monetary policy rate regardless of what a monetary policy regime produced that rate. Thus, we expand our baseline model to include the dummy variable F ixedXR for a fixed exchange rate. It takes 1 for all observations from a country that in a given year either was in the Eurozone or had its currency pegged to the euro. We also include an interaction term between F ixedXR and monetary policy variable M P , to control whether the bank lending channel works differently in economies with a fixed exchange rate.
Results of this analysis are reported in columns (1)- (3) of Table 5 . The estimates of the F ixedXR are insignificant, thus a monetary policy arrangement does not affect the growth of credit at the bank-level.
Also, the estimates of the interaction term are insignificant, thus we do not find differences in the operations of the bank lending channel in economies with fixed compared to floating exchange rate. The estimates of F GN , M P and their interaction term are the same as in the benchmark model.
Financial Crisis. Next, we distinguish between reactions to monetary policy in normal times and during the global financial crisis. We introduce a crisis dummy (equals 1 for years [2008] [2009] [2010] and its interaction with the monetary policy variable M P . Naturally, in the three models that include time dummy for the financial crisis, we abstract from the time fixed effects, due to collinearity. The results of the exercise are presented in Notes: The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The sample is 440 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998-2012. F GN is a foreign ownership dummy and M P is a change in the average nominal interest rate (monetary policy). Models (1)-(3) include fixed exchange rate dummy F ixedXR and its interaction with M P . Models (4)-(6) include financial crisis dummy and its interaction with M P . Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in the Appendix. Estimates for macro and bank controls are suppressed. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
columns (4)- (6) of Table 5 . During financial crisis of 2008-2010 bank lending contracted sharply. Therefore it is not surprising that the estimates of the financial crisis dummy are negative, statistically significant (at 1% confidence level) and large in absolute values. Bank lending in a crisis year was growing between 9 and 17 percentage points slower than in a tranquil year.
This specification provides the most powerful robustness check, as the results are markedly different than Wu et al. (2011) . They observe the difference in the bank lending channel between foreign and domestic banks only in crisis periods. We find that the bank lending channel works just the same during tranquil and crisis times, as the interaction term Crisis * M P is insignificant. The discrepancy between the results may be due to one (or more) of the three reasons. First, their sample includes also Latin American and East Asian countries, which have different legal environments, banking regulations and have experienced more volatile output fluctuations than our sample of only Central and Eastern Europe economies. Second, their timeframe is shorter, namely 1996-2003 compared to our 1998-2012. Third, the combination of the first two factors results in a very different meaning of the crisis times. In their sample crises are local and primarily related to banking sector. In our sample crisis is a singular, global and economy-wide event, while local banking crises are virtually non-existent. Allen et al. (2015) find that foreign banks contract their lending during crisis times more than domestic.
We do not test their hypothesis in the data, as the focus of our paper is different. Our results suggest, that we should attribute differences between domestic and foreign banks lending to their different reactions to monetary policy. We find that those differences are systematic and are present both in tranquil and crisis times.
Inside the Bank Lending Channel
In the previous subsections we have established that domestic and foreign banks react differently to changes in monetary policy. In particular, foreign banks response is muted compared to domestic banks. In this subsection, we ask what are the underlying drivers of this fact. We do so in the spirit of Gambacorta (2005), which is the first study that investigates the heterogeneity of the bank lending channel (in the sample of Italian banks between 1986 and 2001). We introduce interactions of the monetary policy instrument with bank-level characteristics to our regression equation, but keep the distinction between foreign and domestic banks and FGN*MP interaction (which is not considered in Gambacorta (2005) . We estimate the following regression equation:
This exercise enables us to determine how the bank lending channel operates when we account for the heterogeneity at the bank level. Interactions MP jt * Bank it capture the nature of the bank lending channel of all banks in the sample. Interactions MP jt * F GN * Bank it capture the nature of the difference between the bank lending channel in domestic and foreign banks. If flows from the parent bank mitigate the imperfect substitutability of assets that gives rise to the bank lending channel, we should see the coefficient β 3 to be positive and significant. In other words, if internal capital market hypothesis is true, we should observe positive and significant β 3 despite adding interaction terms. The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 6 .
The results offer two new lessons. First, the driver of the bank-lending channel in our sample is operating mostly through larger and more liquid banks (columns (1)- (3)). There is nothing, however, to be learned about the difference in the bank lending channel between foreign and domestic banks, the coefficient at the interaction of foreign ownership dummy and monetary policy indicator is still positive and significant.
Second, once we incorporate within-foreign-banks heterogeneity (columns (4)- (6)), we learn that it is foreign banks profitability that differentiates their response to monetary policy. We also notice that the estimate of F GN * M P interaction becomes insignificant. That is, we can explain differences in the bank Notes: The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The sample is 440 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998-2012. F GN is a foreign ownership dummy and M P is a change in the average nominal interest rate (monetary policy). Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in the Appendix. Models (1)- (3) include interactions of M P with the bank characteristics. Models (4)-(6) additionally include interactions of M P with F GN and the bank characteristics. Estimates for macro and stand alone bank controls are suppressed. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
lending channel using only within-group heterogeneity. Based on this result we offer an alternative way of understanding the bank lending channel differences between domestic and foreign banks.
Foreign banks are on average more profitable than their domestic counterparts. As our results point out, these are the two characteristics that have the power in explaining the bank lending channel. Both can be related to demand heterogeneity, competitive advantage (better selection) and strategic interactions between banks but not necessarily to capital flows and transfers with a parent bank. Thus, we conclude that the tamed response of foreign banks to monetary policy may be due to market segmentation rather than an effect of intra-group capital flows. This is the third main contribution of this paper. The results of the next subsection further strengthen this point.
Outside the Bank Lending Channel
In the last subsection we zoomed in and investigated the forces operating inside the bank lending channel.
In this subsection we zoom out and ask whether foreign banks react to developments in: their home country and their parent bank. An internal capital market hypothesis predicts that they should. We are interested whether foreign variables affect the bank lending channel in a host country, thus in this subsection we go "outside" the bank lending channel.
We have collected the data on the rate of growth of GDP per capita and monetary policy short term interest rates for the 22 countries that we identified as foreign banks' home countries 6 for the years 1998-2012.
Using these data we estimate the following regression equation:
where GDP P is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in home (parent) country of a foreign bank and M P P is the yearly change in the average nominal interest rate in the home (parent) country of a foreign bank. For consistency GDP P and M P P are equal to 0 for all non-foregin banks. Observing positive and significant β 6 and negative and significant β 7 would be a strong signal that the internal market hypothesis is at work.
Next, we have collected the data on the bank-level characteristics for the parent banks. We have identified 124 parent banks and a total of 2151 bank-year observations. This is a reasonably high number of banks and observations, given that not every bank in our sample has a foreign owner, that many foreign banks may have the same owner and that many foreign banks have dispersed ownership and non-bank owners. We estimate the following regression equation:
where Bank P is a vector of bank controls for the parent bank: capitalization, profitability and liquidity (Cap P , P rof P , Liq P ) constructed identically as the respective controls for subsidiaries. As we do not have the data on asset levels for all banks in all home countries we do not construct the respective variable for size. If the internal market hypothesis is at work then at least some of the estimates in β 6 will be significant.
The results of both exercises are displayed in Table 7 . In columns (1)- (3) we test whether credit growth in foreign banks is affected by home country macroeconomic conditions. We find that foreign banks do not Notes: The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The sample is 440 banks in 10 CEE countries and 124 parent banks in 21 countries in years 1998-2012. F GN is a foreign ownership dummy and M P is a change in the average nominal interest rate (monetary policy). Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in the Appendix. Models (1)-(3) control for economic situation in the home country of the foreign bank. Models (4)-(6) control for the financial situation of the parent bank of a foreign bank. Estimates for host country macro and bank controls are suppressed. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
react to economic variables in their home countries. We only observe a very weak reaction to the GDP growth in the fixed effects model and a reaction to monetary policy in the pooled OLS model, but neither of the two effects survive in the system-GMM estimation. If these estimates were significant, the internal market hypothesis would gain strong support. However, the lack of significance is not enough to disprove the hypothesis. It could well be, that parent banks are well diversified and hardly react to macroeconomic developments in their home countries. Therefore it is necessary to look directly into balance sheets of parent banks.
In columns (4)- (6) we test whether credit growth in foreign banks is affected by parent banks financial conditions. We find that foreign banks do not depend on neither capitalization, nor profitability nor liquidity of their parent bank. Foreign banks behavior does not depend on balance sheet conditions of their owner bank. We conclude that the data does not provide evidence for the existence of the internal capital market
The third main contribution of this paper is that the data does not provide strong support for the internal market hypothesis. We have shown this in three steps. First, in Table 6 we provide evidence that differences in the bank lending channel between foreign and domestic banks can be attributed to the observed differences within and between the groups. After controlling for interactions between monetary policy and bank characteristics there is no residual difference that could be attributed to the existence of the internal capital market. Second, in columns (1)- (3) of Table 7 we show that foreign banks do not react to macroeconomic variables in the country of their parent. Third, in columns (4)- (6) of Table 7 we show that foreign banks do not depend on the balance sheet conditions of their parent bank.
Discussion
In this section we discuss an alternative explanation of the differences between foreign and domestic banks.
We propose the market segmentation hypothesis. Under this hypothesis bank clients are heterogeneous.
Foreign banks service more reliable clients whose credit responds less to macroeconomic conditions. Firstly, a foreign bank may inherit credit relationships with clients of its parent bank. When there is selection into foreign expansion, then foreign-owned banks lend to more productive clients. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) find that an acquisition of a domestic bank by a foreign bank leads to a bias in the acquired bank's lending towards large multinational companies. Secondly, when foreign-owned banks have better know-how (e.g. screening technology or marketing) then they can grant credit to more reliable clients, who can service their liabilities even under high interest rates. Bonin et al. (2005) finds evidence that foreign banks bring know-how into the CEE economies' banking sectors and Beck and Brown (2015) show that foreign banks in the CEE economies cherry-pick financially transparent clients.
When the internal market hypothesis is at work, an increased presence of foreign-owned banks weakens monetary policy transmission channel. A host country becomes prone to an instability abroad, as foreign banks import foreign shocks through the internal capital market. On the other hand, foreign banks are also less prone to variations in host country GDP and a monetary policy rate. When market segmentation hypothesis is at work however, increased presence of foreign-owned banks has no impact on the bank lending channel in the aggregate.
Under internal market hypothesis, due to facilitated capital flows with a parent bank, foreign banks should be able to adjust their capital structure more easily than domestic banks and also volatility of dividends should be larger in foreign banks. Those assumption yield testable consequences: i) standard deviation of capitalization in foreign banks is higher than in domestic banks, ii) standard deviation of dividend ratio in foreign banks is higher than in domestic banks. Furthermore, the internal market hypothesis implies that foreign banks should iii) react to innovations abroad (namely to the changes in the interest rate and GDP in the country of the parent bank) and iv) depend on balance sheet conditions of their parent bank.
during crisis times that matters for subsidiary's lending. The market segmentation hypothesis implies on the other hand, that foreign banks do not react to the innovations abroad and that their reaction to the changes in the host country GDP are the same as domestic banks. Furthermore, under market segmentation i) domestic banks should be on average less profitable and ii) smaller than foreign banks. We collect these testable differences and test results in Table 8 .
None of the four internal market hypothesis implications are to be found in the data. The data point towards the market segmentation hypothesis. Anginer et al. (2017) study what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parent banks and show that parent-subsidiary interdependence is lower for subsidiaries that are more independently managed and when host country banking sector is better regulated. On the other hand, foreign banks are significantly bigger, they are also more profitable, but the difference is not significantly different from zero. We note however, that to conduct a direct test one would need data on the intra-group capital flows, hence the results we provide in this section should be treated with caution.
Conclusions
We have investigated empirically the role of foreign banks in the bank lending channel of monetary policy.
We have made three contributions. First, we show that banks adjust their loans to changes in host country's monetary policy. Second, we show that foreign-owned banks are less responsive to monetary policy of a host country than domestic banks in both normal and crisis times. Third we show that the data do not support the conventional view behind this heterogeneity -the internal market hypothesis.
We have discussed whether foreign-owned banks presence may pose additional challenges for policy makers. This happens when the differential response to monetary policy by banks with different ownership is driven by flows between the subsidiary and the owner, an internal capital market. An increased presence of foreign-owned banks would decrease the strength of the bank lending channel.
We argue that market segmentation in the banking sector is a more likely driver of the observed difference.
An increased presence of foreign-owned banks in the economy does not weaken the bank lending channel. 
